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ABSTRACT
Adaptive behavior emerges through a dynamic interaction between cognitive agents and changing
environmental demands. The investigation of information processing underlying adaptive behavior
relies on controlled experimental settings in which individuals are asked to accomplish demanding
tasks whereby a hidden state or an abstract rule has to be learned dynamically. Although perfor-
mance in such tasks is regularly considered as a proxy for measuring high-level cognitive processes,
the standard approach consists in summarizing response patterns by simple heuristic scoring mea-
sures. With this work, we propose and validate a new computational Bayesian model accounting for
individual performance in the established Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. We embed the new model
within the mathematical framework of Bayesian Brain Theory, according to which beliefs about the
hidden environmental states are dynamically updated following the logic of Bayesian inference. Our
computational model maps distinct cognitive processes into separable, neurobiologically plausible,
information-theoretic constructs underlying observed response patterns. We assess model identifi-
cation and expressiveness in accounting for meaningful human performance through extensive sim-
ulation studies. We further apply the model to real behavioral data in order to highlight the utility of
the proposed model in recovering cognitive dynamics at an individual level. Practical and theoret-
ical implications of our computational modelling approach for clinical and cognitive neuroscience
research are finally discussed, as well as potential future improvements.
Keywords Adaptive behavior · Bayesian brain · Cognitive modeling ·Wisconsin Card Sorting Task
1 Introduction
Computational models of cognition provide a way to formally describe and empirically account for mechanistic,
process-based theories of adaptive cognitive functioning [56, 15, 36]. A foundational theoretical framework for de-
scribing functional characteristics of neurocognitive systems has recently emerged under the hood of Bayesian brain
theories [32, 25]. Bayesian brain theories owe their name to their core assumption that neural computations resemble
inference processes following the logic of Bayesian probability theory.
From a Bayesian perspective, cognitive agents exist in an uncertain environment and adaptive behavior emerges
through a dynamic interaction between cognitive agents and environmental demands. In order to behave adaptively,
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cognitive agents must be sensitive to changes in their environment. More formally, they must generate and maintain
internal probabilistic models of environmental states as external sensory information is gathered [24]. From these
internal models, they derive beliefs about the causal structure of the environment and make predictions about future
environmental states. Moreover, internal models form a basis for choosing future actions which can change the state
of the environment and are, in turn, modified and refined by changes in the environment. As a result, internal beliefs
and predictions are also updated to match the new model, according to principles of Bayesian inference [27, 25, 13].
The empirical assessment of adaptive functioning often relies on dynamic reinforcement learning (RL) tasks which
require participants to adapt their behavior during the unfolding of the task. A typical RL task unfolds through
multiple trials as participants observe certain environmental contingencies, take actions, and receive feedback based
on their actions. Optimal performance in a RL experimental paradigm requires that agents infer the probabilistic model
underlying the hidden environmental states. Since these models usually change as the task progresses, agents, in turn,
need to adapt their inferred model, in order to take optimal actions.
In the present work we propose and validate a computational Bayesian model which accounts for the adaptive behav-
ior of cognitive agents in reinforcement learning tasks. More precisely, we focus on the widely adopted Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (WCST; [8, 29]) as a particular instance of such a task. The WCST is perhaps the most popular
neuropsychological setting employed to measure set-shifting, cognitive flexibility and impulsive response modulation
[10, 1] and we consider it as a fundamental paradigm for investigating adaptive behavior from a Bayesian perspective.
The environment of the WCST consists of a target and a set of stimulus cards with geometric figures which vary
according to three perceptual features. The WCST requires participants to infer the correct classification principle
by trial and error using the examiner’s feedback. The feedback is thought to carry a positive or negative information
signaling the agent whether the immediate action was appropriate or not. Modeling adaptive behavior in the WCST
from a Bayesian perspective is straightforward, since observable actions emerge from the interaction between the
internal probabilistic model of the agent and a set of discrete environmental states.
Performance in WCST and similar RL tasks [6, 22] is usually measured via a rough summary metric such as the num-
ber of correct/incorrect responses or pre-defined psychological scoring criteria (see for instance [29]). These metrics
are then used to infer the underlying cognitive processes involved in the task. A major shortcoming of this approach is
that it simply assumes the cognitive processes to be inferred without specifying an explicit process model. Moreover,
summary measures do not utilize the full information present in the data, such as trial-by-trial fluctuations or various
interesting agent-environment interactions. For this reason, crude scoring measures are often insufficient to disen-
tangle the dynamics of the relevant cognitive (sub)processes involved in a RL task. Consequently, an entanglement
between processes at the metric level can prevent us from answering interesting research questions about aspects of
adaptive behavior.
In our view, a sound computational account for adaptive behavior in RL tasks needs to provide at least a quantitative
measure of effective belief updating about the environmental states at each trial. This measure should be comple-
mented by a measure of how feedback-related information influences behavior. The first measure should account for
the integration of meaningful information. In other words, it should describe how prior beliefs about the current en-
vironmental state change after an observation has been made. The second measure should account for signaling the
(im)probability of observing a certain environmental configuration (e.g., an (un)expected feedback given a response)
[50].
Indeed, recent studies suggest that the meaningful information content and the pure unexpectedness of an observation
are processed differently at the neural level. Moreover, such disentanglement appears to be of crucial importance to
the understanding of how new information influences adaptive behavior [42, 50, 45]. Inspired by these results and
previous computational proposals [33], we integrate these different information processing aspects into the current
model from an information-theoretic perspective.
Our computational cognitive model draws heavily on the mathematical frameworks of Bayesian probability theory
and information theory [49]. First, it provides a parsimonious description of observed data in the WCST via two
neurocognitively meaningful parameters, which we dub flexibility and information loss (to be explained in the Model
section). Moreover, it captures the main response patterns obtainable in the WCST via different parameter config-
urations. Second, we formulate a functional connection between cognitive parameters and underlying information
processing mechanisms related to belief updating and prediction formation. We formalize and distinguish between
Bayesian surprise and Shannon surprise as the main mechanisms for adaptive belief updating. Moreover, we intro-
duce a third quantity, which we dub predictive Entropy and which quantifies an agent’s subjective uncertainty about
the current internal model. Finally, we propose to measure these quantities on a trial-by-trial basis and use them as a
proxy for formally representing the dynamic interplay between agents and environments.
2
A PREPRINT - MARCH 18, 2020
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, the WCST is described in more detail and a mathematical rep-
resentation of the new Bayesian computational model is provided. Afterwards, we explore its characteristics through
simulations. We also present an application in which we apply a novel and powerful Bayesian deep neural network
method [46] for model evaluation and parameter estimation. We apply the model to a real behavioral data from an
already published dataset. Finally, we discuss the results as well as the main strengths and limitations of the proposed
model.
2 The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
In a typical WCST, participants learn to pay attention and respond to relevant stimulus features, while ignoring ir-
relevant ones, as a function of experimental feedback. Individuals are asked to match a target card with one of four
stimulus cards. Each card depicts geometric figures that vary in terms of three features, namely, color (red, green,
blue, yellow), shape (triangle, star, cross, circle) and number of objects (1, 2, 3 and 4), according to a correct sorting
rule on any given trial (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Suppose that the current sorting rule is the feature shape. The target card in the first trial (left box) contains
two blue triangles. A correct response requires that the agent matches the target card with the stimulus card containing
the single triangle (arrow represents the correct choice), regardless of the features color and number. The same applies
for the second trial (right box) in which matching the target card with the stimulus card containing three yellow crosses
is the correct response.
Each response in the WCST is followed by a feedback informing the participant if his/her response is correct or
incorrect. After some fixed number of consecutive responses, the sorting rule is changed by the experimenter without
warning, and participants are required to infer the new sorting rule. Clearly, the most adaptive response would be to
explore the remaining possible rules. However, participants sometimes would persist responding according to the old
rule and produce what is called a perseverative response.
3 The Model
The core idea behind our computational framework is to encode the concept of belief into a generative probabilistic
model of the environment. Belief updating then corresponds to recursive Bayesian updating of the internal model
based on current and past interactions between the agent and its environment. Optimal or sub-optimal actions are
selected according to a well specified or a misspecified internal model and, in turn, cause perceptible changes in the
environment.
We assume that the cognitive agent aims to infer the true hidden state of the environment by processing and integrating
sensory information from the environment. Within the context of the WCST, the hidden environmental states might
change at a non-constant rate, so the agent needs to rely on environmental feedback and own actions to infer the
current state. We assume that the agent maintains an internal probability distribution over the states at each individual
trial of the WCST. The agent then updates this distribution upon making new observations. In particular, the hidden
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environmental states to be inferred are the three features, st ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The posterior probability of the states depends
on an observation vector xt = (at, ft), which consists of the pair of agent’s response (actions) at ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and
received feedback ft ∈ {0, 1} in a given trial t = 0, ..., T . The discrete response at represents the stimulus card
indicator being matched with a target card at trial t. We denote a sequence of observations as x0:t = (x0,x1, ...,xt) =
((a0, f0), (a1, f1), (a2, f2), ..., (at, ft)) and set x0 = ∅ in order to indicate that there are no observations at the onset
of the task. Thus, trial-by-trial belief updating is recursively computed according to Bayes’ rule:
p(st|x0:t) = p(xt|st,x0:t−1)p(st|x0:t−1)
p(xt|x0:t−1) (1)
Accordingly, the agent’s posterior belief about the task-relevant features st after observing a sequence of response-
feedback pairs x0:t is proportional to the product of the likelihood of observing a particular response-feedback pair
and the agent’s prior belief about the task-relevant feature in the current trial. The likelihood of an observation is
computed as follows:
p(xt|st,x0:t−1) = ftp(at|st = i) + (1− ft)(1− p(at|st = i))
ft
∑
j p(at|st = j) + (1− ft)
∑
j(1− p(at|st = j))
(2)
and p(at|st = i) indicates the probability of a matching between the target and the stimulus card assumed that
the current feature is i. Here, we assume the likelihood of a current observation to be independent from previous
observations without loss of generality, that is:
p(xt|st,x0:t−1) = p(xt|st)
The prior belief for a given trial t is computed based on the posterior belief generated in the previous trial,
p(st−1|x0:t−1), and the agent’s belief about the probability of transitions between the hidden states, p(st|st−1). The
prior belief can also be considered as a predictive probability over the hidden states. The predictive distribution for an
upcoming trial t is computed according to the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation:
p(st+1 = j|x0:t) =
3∑
i=1
p(st+1 = j|st = i,Γ(t))p(st = i|x0:t) (3)
where Γ(t) represents a stability matrix describing transitions between the states (to be explained shortly). Thus,
the agent combines information from the updated belief (posterior distribution) and the belief about the transition
properties of the environmental states to predict the most probable future state. The predictive distribution represents
the internal model of the cognitive agent according to which actions are generated.
The stability matrix Γ(t) encodes the agent’s belief about the probability of states being stable or likely to change in
the next trial. In other words, the stability matrix reflects the cognitive agent’s internal representation of the dynamic
probabilistic model of the task environment. It is computed on each trial based on the response-feedback pair, xt, and
a matching signal,mt, which are observed.
The matching signal mt is a vector informing the cognitive agent which features are currently relevant (meaningful),
such that m(i)t = 1 when a positive feedback is associated with a response implying feature st = i, and m
(i)
t = 0
otherwise. Note, that the matching signal is not a free parameter of the model, but is completely determined by the
task contingencies. The matching signal vector allows the agent to compute the state activation level ω(i)t ∈ [0, 1] for
the hidden state st = i, which provides an internal measure of the (accumulated) evidence for each hidden state at trial
t. Thus, the activation levels of the hidden states are represented by a vector ωt. The stability matrix is a square and
asymmetric matrix related to hidden state activation levels such that:
Γ(t) =

ω
(1)
t
1
2 (1− ω(1)t ) 12 (1− ω(1)t )
1
2 (1− ω(2)t ) ω(2)t 12 (1− ω(2)t )
1
2 (1− ω(3)t ) 12 (1− ω(3)t ) ω(3)t
 (4)
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where the entries Γii(t) in the main diagonal represent the elements of the activation vector ωt, and the non-diagonal
elements are computed so as to ensure that rows sum to 1. The state activation vector is computed in each trial as
follows: ω
(1)
t
ω
(2)
t
ω
(3)
t
 = ftωδt−1
m
(1)
t
m
(2)
t
m
(3)
t
+ λ
(1− ft)ωδt−1
1−m
(1)
t
1−m(2)t
1−m(3)t


ω
(1)
t−1
ω
(2)
t−1
ω
(3)
t−1
 . (5)
This equation reflects the idea that state activations are simultaneously affected by the observed feedback, ft, and the
matching signal vector, mt. However, the matching signal vector conveys different information based on the current
feedback. Matching a target card with a stimulus card makes a feature (or a subset of features) informative for a
specific state. The vector mt contributes to increase (resp. decrease) the activation level of a state if the feature is
informative for that state when a positive (resp. negative) feedback is received.
The parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] modulates the efficiency to disengage attention to a given state-activation configuration when
a negative feedback is processed. We therefore term this parameter flexibility. We also assume that information from
the matching signal vector can degrade by slowing down the rate of evidence accumulation for the hidden states. This
means that the matching signal vector can be re-scaled based on the current state activation level. The parameter
δ ∈ [0, 1] is introduced to achieve this re-scaling. When δ = 0, there is no re-scaling and updating of the state
activation levels relies on the entire information conveyed by mt. On the other extreme, when δ = 1, several trials
have to be accomplished before converging to a given configuration of the state activation levels. Equivalently, higher
values of δ affect the entropy of the distribution over hidden states by decreasing the probability of sampling of the
correct feature. We therefore refer to δ as information loss.
The free parameters λ and δ are central to our computational model, since they regulate the rate at which the internal
model converges to the true task environmental model. Eq. (5) can be expressed in compact notation as follows:
ωt = ftω
δ
t−1mt + λ
[
(1− ft)ωδt−1(1−mt)
]
ωt−1 (6)
Note that the information loss parameter δ affects the amount of information that a cognitive agent acquires from
environmental contingencies, irrespective of the type of feedback received. Global information loss thus affects the
rate at which the divergence between the agent’s internal model and the true model is minimized. Figure 2 illustrates
these ideas.
The probabilistic representation of adaptive behaviour provided by our Bayesian agent model allows us to quantify
(latent) cognitive dynamics by means of meaningful information-theoretic measures. Information theory has, indeed,
proven to be an effective and natural mathematical language to account for functional integration of structured cog-
nitive processes and to relate them to brain activity [33, 26, 14, 55, 23]. In particular, we are interested in three key
measures, namely, Bayesian surprise, Bt, Shannon surprise, It, and entropy, Ht. The subscript t indicates that
we can compute each quantity on a trial-by-trial basis. Each quantity is thought to reflect a specific interpretation in
terms of separate neurocognitive processes. Bayesian surprise Bt quantifies the magnitude of the update from prior
belief to posterior belief. Shannon surprise It quantifies the improbability of an observation given an agent’s prior
expectation. Finally, entropyHt measures the degree of epistemic uncertainty regarding the true environmental states.
Such measures are thought to account for the ability of the agent to manage uncertainty as emerging as a function of
competing behavioral affordances [30]. We expect an efficient adaptive functioning system to attenuate uncertainty
over environmental states (current features), by reducing the entropy of its internal probabilistic model.
Bayesian surprise can be computed as the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence between prior and posterior beliefs
about the environmental states. In our model representation, actions are sampled from predictive distributions which
integrate information from the posterior belief about the hidden states and belief about their dynamics. The Bayesian
surprise is then thought to account for the divergence between the predictive model for the current trial, and the updated
predictive model for the upcoming trial. It is computed as follows:
Bt = KL[p(st+1|x0:t)||p(st|x0:t−1)]
=
3∑
i=1
[
p(st+1 = i|x0:t) log
(
p(st+1 = i|x0:t)
p(st = i|x0:t−1)
)]
(7)
The Shannon surprise of a current observation given a previous one is computed as follows:
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Figure 2: Suppose the correct sorting rule is the feature shape. The figure shows the rate of convergence of the
predictive distributions to the true task environmental model. The predictive distributions at trial t + 1 depends on
the sorting action at (first row) and the received feedback ft (second row). Two examples of updating a predictive
distribution are shown: one in which information loss is high (δ = 0.7, third row), and one in which information
loss is low (δ = 0.3, fifth row). High information loss slows down the convergence of the internal model to the true
environmental model. The gray bar plots represent the predictive probability distribution over the rules from which an
action is sampled at each trial. Dotted bars represent the updated predictive distribution after the feedback observation.
For each scenario, trial-by-trial information-theoretic measures are shown.
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It = − log p(xt|x0:t−1)
= − log
3∑
i=1
[p(xt|st = i)p(st = i|x0:t−1)]
(8)
Finally, the entropy is computed over the predictive distribution in order to account for the uncertainty in the internal
model of the agent in trial t as follows:
Ht = E [− log p(st|x0:t−1)]
= −
3∑
i=1
p(st = i|x0:t−1) log p(st = i|x0:t−1)
(9)
Once the flexibility (λ) and information loss (δ) parameters are recovered from data, the information-theoretic quanti-
ties can be easily computed and visualized for each trial of the WCST (see Figure 2). This allows to rephrase standard
neurocognitive constructs in terms of measurable information-theoretic quantities. Moreover, the dynamics of these
quantities, as well as their interactions, can be used for formulating and testing hypotheses about the neurcognitive
underpinnings of adaptive behavior in a principled way, as discussed later in the paper.
3.1 Simulations
In this section we evaluate the expressiveness of the model by assessing its ability to reproduce meaningful behavioral
patterns as a function of its two free parameters. We study how the generative model behaves when performing the
WCST in a 2-factorial simulated Monte Carlo design where flexibility (λ) and information loss (δ) are systematically
varied.
In this simulation, the Heaton version of the task [29] is administered to the Bayesian cognitive agent. In this particular
version, the sorting rule (true environmental state) changes after a fixed number of consecutive correct responses. In
particular, when the agent correctly matches the target card in 10 consecutive trials, the sorting rule is automatically
changed. The task ends after completing a maximum of 128 trials.
3.1.1 Generative Model
The cognitive agent’s responses are generated at each time step (trial) by processing the experimental feedback. Its
performance depends on the parameters governing the computation of the relevant quantities. The generative algorithm
is outlined in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Bayesian cognitive agent
1: Set parameters θ = (λ, δ)
2: Set initial activation levels ω0 = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5)
3: Set initial observation x0 = ∅ and p(s1|x0) = p(s1)
4: for t = 1, ..., T do
5: Sample feature from prior/predictive internal model st ∼ p(st|x0:t−1)
6: Obtain a new observation xt = (at, ft)
7: Compute state posterior p(st|x0:t)
8: Compute new activation levels ωt
9: Compute stability matrix Γ(t)
10: Update prior/predictive internal model to p(st+1|x0:t)
11: end for
3.1.2 Simulation 1: Clinical Assessment of the Bayesian Agent
Ideally, the qualitative performance of the Bayesian cognitive agent will resemble human performance. To this aim, we
adopt a metric which is usually employed in clinical assessment of test results in neurological and psychiatric patients
[11, 61, 7, 35]. Thus, agent performance is codified according to a neuropsychological criterion [29, 20] which allows
to classify responses into several response types. These response types provide the scoring measures for the test.
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Here, we are interested in: 1) non-perseverative errors (E); 2) perseverative errors (PE); 3) number of trials to complete
the first category (TFC); and 4) number of failures to maintain set (FMS). Perseverative errors occur when the agent
applies a sorting rule which was valid before the rule has been changed. Usually, detecting a perseveration error is far
from trivial, since several response configurations could be observed when individuals are required to shift a sorting
rule after completing a category (see [20] for details). On the other hand, non-perseverative errors refer to all errors
which do not fit the above description, or in other words, do not occur as a function of changing the sorting rule, such
as casual errors.
The number of trials to complete the first category tells us how many trials the agent needs in order to achieve the first
sorting principle, and can be seen as an index of conceptual ability [3, 51]. Finally, a failure to maintain a set occurs
when the agent fails to match cards according to the sorting rule after it can be determined that the agent has acquired
the rule. A given sorting rule is assumed to be acquired when the individual correctly sorts at least five cards in a
row [29, 18]. Thus, a failure to maintain a set arises whenever a participant suddenly changes the sorting strategy in
the absence of negative feedback. Failures to maintain a set are mostly attributed to distractibility. We compute this
measure by counting the occurrences of first errors after the acquisition of a rule.
We run the generative model by varying flexibility across four levels, λ ∈ {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}, and information loss
across three levels, δ ∈ {0.4, 0.7, 0.9}. We generate data from 150 synthetic cognitive agents per parameter combina-
tion and compute standard scoring measures for each of the agents simulated responses. Results from the simulation
runs are depicted in Figure 3.
The simulated performance of our Bayesian cognitive agent demonstrates that different parameter combinations cap-
ture different meaningful behavioral patterns. In other words, flexibility and information loss seem to interact in a
theoretically meaningful way.
First, overall errors increase when flexibility decreases, which is reflected by the inverse relation between the number
of casual, as well as perseverative, errors and the values of parameter λ. Moreover, this pattern is consistent across all
the levels of parameter δ. More precisely, information loss seems to contribute to the characterization of the casual
and the perseverative components of the error in a different way. Perseverative errors are likely to occur after a sorting
rule change and reflect the inability of the agent to use feedback to disengage attention from the currently attended
feature. They therefore result from local cognitive dynamics conditioned on a particular stage of the task (e.g., after
completing a series of correct responses).
Second, information loss does not interact with flexibility when perseverative errors are considered. This is due
to the fact that high (resp. low) information loss affects general performance by yielding a dysfunctional response
strategy which increases (resp. decreases) the probability of making an error at any stage of the task. The lack of such
interaction provides evidence that our computational model can disentangle between error patterns due to perseveration
and those due to general distractibility, according to neuropsychological scoring criteria.
However, in our framework, flexibility is allowed to yield more general and non-local cognitive dynamics as well.
Indeed, λ plays a role whenever belief updating is demanded as a function of negative feedback. An error classified
as non-perseverative (e.g., casual error) by the scoring criteria might still be processed as a feedback-related evidence
for belief updating. Consistently, the interaction between λ and δ in accounting for causal errors shows that perfor-
mance worsens when both flexibility and information loss become less optimal, and that such pattern becomes more
pronounced for lower values of δ.
On the other hand, a specific effect of information loss can be observed for the scoring measures related to slow
information processing and distractibility. The number of trials to achieve the first category reflects the efficiency
of the agent in arriving at the first true environmental model. Flexibility does not contribute meaningfully to the
accumulation of errors before completing the first category for some levels of information loss. This is reflected by the
fact that the mean number of trials increases as a function of δ, and do not change across levels of λ for low and mid
values of δ. A similar pattern applies for failures to maintain a set. Both scoring measures index a deceleration of the
process of evidence accumulation for a specific environmental configuration, although the latter is a more exhaustive
measures of dysfunctional adaptation.
Therefore, an interaction between parameters can be observed when information loss is high. A slow internal model
convergence process increases the amount of errors due to improper rule sampling from the internal environmental
model. However, internal model convergence also plays a role when a new category has to be accomplished after
completing an older one. On the one hand, compromised flexibility increases the amount of errors due to inefficient
feedback processing. This leads to longer trial windows needed to achieve the first category. On the other hand,
when information loss is high, belief updating upon negative feedback is compromised due to high internal model
uncertainty. At this point, the probability to err due to distractibility increases, as accounted by the failures to maintain
a set measures.
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Figure 3: Clinical scoring measures as functions of flexibility and information loss - simulated scenarios. Cells show
the density of scoring measures for the levels of λ across different levels of δ. In particular, they show the distribution
of non-perseverative errors (E), perseverative errors (PE), number of trials to complete the first category (TFC), number
of failures to maintain set (FMS) obtained from 150 synthetic agent’s response simulations for each cell of the factorial
design.
9
A PREPRINT - MARCH 18, 2020
Finally, the joint effect of δ and λ for high levels of information loss suggests that the roles played by the two cognitive
parameters in accounting for adaptive functioning can be entangled when neuropsychological scoring criteria are
considered.
3.1.3 Simulation 2: Information-theoretic Analysis of the Bayesian Agent
In the following, we explore a different simulation scenario in which information-theoretic measures are derived to as-
sess performance of the Bayesian cognitive agent. In particular, we explore the functional relationship between cogni-
tive parameters and the dynamics of the recovered information-theoretic measures by simulating observed responses by
varying flexibility across three levels, λ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}, and information loss across three levels, δ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}.
For this simulation scenario, we make no prior assumptions about sub-types of error classification. Instead, we inves-
tigate the dynamic interplay between Bayesian surprise, Bt, Shannon surprise, It, and entropy, Ht over the entire
course of 128 trials in the WCST.
Figure 4: Information-theoretic measures varying as a function of flexibility λ and information loss δ across 128 trials
of the WCST. Optimal belief updating and uncertainty reduction are achieved with low information loss and high
flexibility (first row, third column).
Figure 4 depicts results from the nine simulation scenarios. Although an exhaustive discussion on cognitive dynamics
should couple information-theoretic measures with patterns of correct and error responses, we focus solely on the
information-theoretic time series for illustrative purposes. We refer to the Application section for a more detailed
description of the relation between observed responses and estimated information-theoretic measures in the context of
data from a real experiment.
Again, simulated performance of the Bayesian cognitive agent shows that different parameter combinations yield
different patterns of cognitive dynamics. Observed spikes and their related magnitudes signal informative task events
(e.g., unexpected negative feedback), as accounted by Shannon surprise, or belief updating, as accounted by Bayesian
surprise. Finally, entropy encodes the epistemic uncertainty about the environmental model on a trial-by-trial basis.
In general, low information loss ensures optimal behavior by speeding up internal model convergence by decreasing
the number of trials needed to minimize uncertainty about the environmental states. Low uncertainty reflects two main
aspects of adaptive behavior. On the one hand, the probability that a response occurs due to sampling of improper rules
decreases, allowing the agent to prevent random responses due to distractibility. On the other hand, model convergence
10
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entails a peaked Shannon surprise when a negative feedback occurs, due to the divergence between predicted and actual
observations.
Flexibility plays a role in integrating feedback information in order to enable belief updating. The first row depicted
in Figure 4 shows cognitive dynamics related to low information loss, across the levels of flexibility. As can be
noticed, there is a positive relation between the magnitude of the Bayesian surprise and the level of flexibility, although
unexpectedness yields approximately the same amount of signaling, as accounted by peaked Shannon surprise. From
this perspective, surprise and belief updating can be considered functionally separable, where the first depends on the
particular internal model probability configuration related to δ, whilst the second depends on flexibility λ.
However, more interesting patterns can be observed when information loss increases. In particular, model convergence
slows down and several trials are needed to minimize predictive model entropy. Casual errors might occur within trial
windows characterized by high uncertainty, and interactions between entropy and Shannon surprise can be observes
in such cases. In particular, Shannon surprise magnitude increases (resp. decreases) when model’s entropy decreases
(resp. increases), that is, during the task phases in which the internal model has converged (resp. not converged). As
a consequence, negative feedback could be classified as informative or uninformative, based on the uncertainty in the
current internal model. This is reflected by the negative relation between entropy and Shannon surprise, as can be
noticed by inspecting the graphs depicted in the third row of Figure 4. Therefore, the magnitude of belief updating
depends on the interplay between entropy and Shannon surprise, and can differ based on the values of the two measures
in a particular task phase.
In sum, both simulation scenarios suggest that the simulated behavior of our generative model is in accord with
theoretical expectations. Moreover, the flexibility and information loss parameters can account for a wide range of
observed response patterns and inferred dynamics of information processing.
4 Model Identification
In this section, we discuss the computational framework for recovering the parameters of our model from observed
behavioral data. Parameter recovery is essential to inferring the cognitive dynamics underlying observed behavior in
real-world applications of the model. This section is slightly more technical and can be skipped without significantly
affecting the flow of the text.
Making our cognitive model suitable for application in real-world contexts entails estimating parameters from available
data and accounting for uncertainty about parameter estimates. Indeed, uncertainty quantification turns out to be
a fundamental and challenging goal when first-level quantities, that is, cognitive parameter estimates, are used to
recover (second-level) information-theoretic measures of cognitive dynamics. The main difficulties arise when model
complexity makes estimation and uncertainty quantification intractable at both analytical and numerical levels. For
instance, in our case, probability distributions for the hidden model are generated at each trial, and the mapping
between hidden states and responses changes depending on the structure of the task environment.
Identifying such a dynamic mapping is relatively easy from a generative perspective, but it becomes challenging, and
almost impossible, when reverse engineering is required. Generally, this problem arises when no likelihood function
relating model parameters to the data is available, or when the likelihood function is too complex to be evaluated [52].
To overcome these limitations, we apply the recently developed BayesFlow method [46]. BayesFlow is a powerful
computational tool that allows to estimate parameters and quantify uncertainty in a unified probabilistic framework
when inverting the generative model is intractable. The method is based on recent advances in deep probabilistic
modeling and makes no assumptions about the shape of the true parameter posteriors. Thus, our ultimate goal becomes
to approximate and analyze the joint posterior distribution over the model parameters. The posterior is given via an
application of Bayes’ rule:
p(θ|x0:T ,m0:T ) = p(x0:T ,m0:T |θ)p(θ)∫
p(x0:T ,m0:T |θ)p(θ)dθ (10)
where we set θ = (λ, δ) and stack all observations and matching signals into the vectors x0:T = (x0,x1, ...,xT ) and
m0:T = (m0,m1, ...,mT ), respectively. The BayesFlow method uses simulations from the generative model to learn
and clibrate a probabilistic mapping between data and parameters. First, it utilizes the fact that the data likelihood at
each trial t can be reparameterized as:
xt ∼ p(xt|θ,mt)⇐⇒ xt = g(θ,mt, ξ) with ξ ∼ p(ξ) (11)
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with g being the generative Bayesian cognitive model (Algorithm 1) and ξ independent noise representing the non-
deterministic relationship between data-generating parameters and generated data. Second, BayesFlow utilizes the
fact that data can easily be simulated by repeatedly running g with different θ and thereby iteratively minimizes the
divergence between the true posterior and an approximate posterior via an invertible neural network. This approach
allows to obtain samples from the approximate joint posterior distribution of the cognitive parameters of interest,
which can be further processed in order to extract meaningful statistics (e.g., posterior mean, maximum a posteriori).
At this point, we must ensure that our computational model can be reliably fit to data. To this purpose, the main
requirement is that the parameters can be recovered accurately and uncertainty in estimates is well-calibrated.
To address such a requirement, we train the invertible network for 50 epochs which amount to 50000 backpropagation
updates. We then validate performance on a separate validation set of 1000 simulated data sets with known different
ground truth parameter values. Training the networks took less than a day on a single machine with an NVIDIA R©
GTX1060 graphics card. In contrast, obtaining full parameter posteriors from the entire validation set took approxi-
mately 1.78 seconds. In what follows, we describe and report all performance validation metrics.
To assess the accuracy of point estimates, we compute the root mean squared error (RMSE) and the coefficient of
determination (R2) between estimated and true parameter values. To assess the quality of the approximate posteriors,
we compute a calibration error [46] of the empirical coverage of each marginal posterior Finally, we implement
simulation-based calibration (SBC, [57]) for visually detecting systematic biases in the approximate posteriors.
Point Estimates. Point estimates obtained by posterior means as well as corresponding RMSE and R2 metrics are
depicted in Figure 5a. Note, that point estimates do not have any special status in Bayesian inference, as they could
be misleading depending on the shape of the posteriors. However, they are simple to interpret and useful for ease-
of-comparison. We observe that pointwise recovery of λ is better than that of δ. This is mainly due to suboptimal
pointwise recovery in the lower (0, 0.1) range of δ. This pattern is evident in Figure 5a and is due to the fact that δ
values in this range produce almost indistinguishable data patterns. Bootstrap estimates yielded an average RMSE of
0.155 (SD = 0.004) and an average R2 of 0.708 (SD = 0.015) for the δ parameter. An average RMSE of 0.094
(SD = 0.002) and an average R2 of 0.895 (SD = 0.007) were obtained for the λ parameter. These results suggest
good global pointwise recovery but also warrant the inspection of full posteriors, especially in the low ranges of δ.
Full Posteriors. Average bootstrap calibration error was 0.011 (SD = 0.005) for the marginal posterior of δ and
0.014 (SD = 0.007) for the marginal posterior of λ. Calibration error is perhaps the most important metric here, as
it measures potential under- or overconfidence across all confidence intervals of the approximate posterior (i.e., an α-
confidence interval should contain the true posterior with a probability of α, for all α ∈ (0, 1)). Thus, low calibration
error indicates a faithful uncertainty representation of the approximate posteriors. Additionally, SBC-histograms are
depicted in Figure 5b. As shown by [57], deviations from the uniformity of the rank statistic (also know as a PIT
histogram) indicate systematic biases in the posterior estimates. A visual inspection of the histograms reveals that the
posterior means slightly overestimate the true values of δ. This corroborates the pattern seen in Figure 5a for the lower
range of δ.
Finally, Figure 5c depicts the full marginal posteriors on two validation sets. Even on these two data sets, we observe
strikingly different posterior shapes. The marginal posterior of δ obtained from the first data set is slightly left-skewed
and has its density concentrated over the (0.8, 1.0) range. On the other hand, the marginal posterior of δ from the
second data set is noticeably right-skewed and peaked across the lower range of the parameter. The marginal posteriors
of λ appear more symmetric and warrant the use of the posterior mean as a useful summary of the distribution.
These two examples underline the importance of investigating full posterior distributions as a means to encode all
relevant information about the parameters. Moreover, they demonstrate the advantage of imposing no distributional
assumptions on the resulting posteriors, as their form and sharpness can vary widely depending on the concrete data
set.
5 Application
In this section we fit the Bayesian cognitive model to real clinical data. The aim of this application is to evaluate the
ability of our computational framework to account for dysfunctional cognitive dynamics of information processing
in psychiatric patients. To this aim, we estimate parameters at individual level from a group of participants from an
already published dataset [7].
Here, we focus on the estimation of the two relevant parameters λ and δ from a participant’s observed response and
feedback data. Our goal is to utilize the full information contained in the data and, further, quantify the uncertainty in
parameter estimates.
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(a) Posterior means vs. true parameter values (b) Simulation-based calibration.
(c) Example full posteriors (d) Information-theoretic measures
Figure 5: Parameter recovery results on validation data; (a) Posterior means vs. true parameter values; (b) Histograms
of the rank statistic used for simulation-based calibration; (c) Example full posteriors for two validation data sets; (d)
Example information-theoretic dynamics recovered from the parameter posteriors.
5.1 The Data
The dataset used in this application consists of responses collected by administering the Heaton version of the WCST
to healthy and substance dependent individuals (SDIs). Participants in the study were adults (> 18 years old) and gave
their informed consent for inclusion which was approved by the appropriate human subject committee at the University
of Iowa. SDIs were diagnosed as substance dependent based on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV criteria
[19].
For this application, we focus on SDI participants who achieved all 128 trials in the task. This is the only selection
criterion employed, and is motivated by the aim to utilize a maximum amount of data for model identification. How-
ever, this decision is not necessitated by the estimation method, since several trial numbers can be used for parameter
recovery. Thus, the resulting dataset consists consists of 10 SDIs.
5.2 Results
We fit the Bayesian cognitive agent to data from each participant and obtain individual posterior distributions (see Fig-
ure 6) over the parameters. The advantage of modeling cognitive dynamics of individuals from a clinical population is
that model predictions can be examined in light of available evidence about individual performances. SDIs are known
to demonstrate inefficient conceptualization of the task and dysfunctional error-prone response strategies. This has
been attributed to defective error monitoring and behavior modulation systems, which depend on cingulate and frontal
brain regions functionality [34, 60]. Therefore, we expect our model to consistently capture such characteristics.
The recovered joint posteriors reveal a rather homogeneous pattern across SDI participants. Flexibility appears seri-
ously impaired, as reflected by the low values of λ. The ability to efficiently achieve a suitable representation of the
(task) environment also appears compromised due to abnormal information loss, as reflected by the high values of δ.
However, slight individual differences in the parameters can be observed.
Parameter estimates suggest that error patterns produced by these individuals might be induced by a non-trivial inter-
action between cognitive sub-components.
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Figure 6: Joint posteriors of the flexibility (λ) and information loss (δ) parameters obtained from the sample of 10
patients. We observe low flexibility and high information loss across all patient. Darker colors represent regions of
low posterior density; lighter colors represent regions of high posterior density.
Lower values of λ imply that errors are likely to be produced by generating responses from an internal environmental
model which is no longer valid. In other words, the agent is unable to rely on local feedback-related information in
order to update beliefs about hidden states. On the other hand, higher values of δ reflect a general inefficiency of belief
updating processes due to slow convergence to the optimal probabilistic environmental model.
From this perspective, Bayesian surpriseBt and Shannon surpriseIt might play different roles in regulating behavior
based on different internal model probability configurations. These configurations are governed by the interplay
between cognitive parameters.
For instance, it is often the case that psychiatric patients produce a noticeable amount of errors distributed sparsely
across windows of trials. However, errors might be processed differently based on the status of the internal envi-
ronmental states representation, as reflected by the entropy of the predictive model, Ht. Thus, information-theoretic
measures allow to describe cognitive dynamics on a trial-by-trial basis and, further, to disentangle the effect that
different feedback-related information processing dynamics exert on adaptive behavior.
To further clarify these concepts, we investigate the reconstructed time series of information-theoretic quantities of an
exemplary individual response pattern (Patient 7; Figure 7b).
Figure 7 depicts the unfolding of cognitive dynamics across a subset of trials in the task. Information-theoretic mea-
sures are recovered by computing the posterior mean of parameters.
Processing unexpected observations is accounted by the quantification of surprise at observing a response-feedback
pair which is inconsistent with the current internal model of the task environment. Negative feedback is maximally
informative when errors occur after the internal model has converged to the true task model (grey area), or the entropy
approaches zero (grey line). The Shannon surprise (orange line) is maximal when errors occur within trial windows in
which the agent’s uncertainty about environmental states is minimal (orange areas).
However, internal model updates following an informative feedback are not optimally performed, which is reflected
by very small Bayesian surprise (blue line). This is due to impaired flexibility, and reflects the fact that after internal
model convergence, informative feedback is not processed adequately and the internal model becomes impervious to
change.
Conversely, errors occurring when the agent is uncertain about the true environmental state carry no useful informa-
tion for belief updating, since the system fails to conceive such errors as unexpected and informative. The information
loss parameter plays a crucial role in characterizing this cognitive behavior. The slow convergence to the true envi-
ronmental model, accompanied by the slow reduction of entropy in the predictive model, leads to a large number of
trials required to achieve a good representation of the current task environment (white areas). Errors occurring within
trial windows with large predictive model entropy (green area) do not affect subsequent behavior, and feedback is
maximally uninformative.
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(a) Joint posterior of flexibility and information loss parameters.
(b) Time series of information-theoretic measures
Figure 7: Recovered cognitive dynamics of patient 7. (a) Joint posterior of the flexibility and information loss pa-
rameters. The marginal posteriors indicate very low flexibility and very high information loss; (b) Time series of
information-theoretic measures depicting belief updating and agent’s internal model uncertainty during the unfolding
of the task. Labels C and E indicate correct and error responses.
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The role that predictive (internal) model uncertainty plays in characterizing the way the agent processes feedback
allows to disentangle sub-types of errors based on the information they convey for subsequent belief updating. From
this perspective, error classification is entirely dependent on the status of the internal environmental model across
task phases. Identifying such a dynamic latent process is therefore fundamental, since the error codification criterion
evolves with respect to the internal information processing dynamics. Otherwise, the problem of inferring which errors
are due to perseverance in maintaining an older (converged) internal model and which due to uncertainty about the
true environmental state becomes intractable, or even impossible.
6 Discussion
Investigating information processing related to changing environmental contingencies is fundamental to understanding
adaptive behavior. For this purpose, cognitive scientists usually rely on controlled settings in which individuals are
asked to accomplish (possibly) highly demanding tasks whose demands are assumed to resemble those of natural en-
vironments. Even in the most trivial cases, such as the WCST, optimal performance requires integrated and distributed
neurocognitive processes. Moreover, these processes are unlikely to be isolated by simple scoring or aggregate perfor-
mance measures.
In the current work, we developed and validated a new computational Bayesian model which maps distinct cogni-
tive processes into separable information-theoretic constructs underlying observed adaptive behavior. We argue that
these constructs could help describe and investigate the neurocognitive processes underlying adaptive behavior in a
principled way.
In contrast to similar modeling approaches involving information-theoretic constructs [45, 42, 50], we adopt a pow-
erful computational method for model identification. The method allows us to recover and quantify uncertainties in
parameter estimates which is important for assessing the reliability of information-theoretic constructs in accounting
for cognitive properties. In our case, uncertainty or identifiability of cognitive parameters is captured via a full joint
posterior, and then a representative statistics of parameter posteriors (e.g., maximum a posteriori, posterior mean) can
be used to derive the unfolding of information-theoretic quantities on a trial-by-trial basis.
Several computational models have been proposed to analyze performances in the WCST (and similar RL tasks), rang-
ing from behavioral [10, 53] to neural network models [17, 2, 37, 41]. These models aim to provide psychologically
interpretable parameters or biologically inspired network structures, respectively, accounting for specific qualitative
patterns of observed data. The main advantage of our Bayesian cognitive agent representation is that it provides both
a cognitive and a measurement model which coexist within a substantiated theoretical framework.
Therefore, although our computational model is not a neural model, it might provide a suitable description of cognitive
dynamics at a representational and computational level [39]. This description can then be related to neural functioning
underlying adaptive behavioral. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that neural processes related to belief main-
tenance/updating and unexpectedness are crucial for performance in the WCST. In particular, brain circuits associated
with cognitive control and belief formation, such as the parietal cortex and prefrontal regions, seem to share a func-
tional basis with neural substrates involved in adaptive tasks [42]. Prefrontal regions appear to mediate the relation
between feedback and belief updating [38] and efficient functioning in such brain structures seems to be heavily de-
pendent on dopaminergic neuromodulation [44]. Moreover, the dopaminergic system plays a role in the processing of
salient and unexpected environmental stimuli, in learning based on error-related information, and in evaluating candi-
date actions [42, 16, 28]. Accordingly, dopaminergic system functioning has been put in relation with performance in
the WCST [31, 48] and shown to be critical for the main executive components involved in the task, that is, cognitive
flexibility and set-shifting [9, 54]. Further, neural activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is increased when a
negative feedback occurs in the context of the WCST [38]. This finding corroborates the view that the ACC is part
of an error-detection network which allocates attentional resources to prevent future errors. The ACC might play a
crucial role in adaptive functioning by encoding error-related or, more generally, feedback-related information. Thus,
it could facilitate the updating of internal environmental models [47].
Such neurobiological evidence suggests that brain networks involved in the WCST might endow adaptive behavior by
accounting for maintaining/updating of an internal model of the environment and efficient processing of unexpected
information. Is it noteworthy, that these processing aspects are incorporated into our computational framework. At
this point, the empirical and theoretical potentials of the proposed computational framework for investigating adaptive
functioning can be outlined.
Model-Based Neuroscience. Recent studies have pointed out the advantage of simultaneously modeling and analyzing
neural and behavioral data within a joint modeling framework. In this way, the latter can be used to provide information
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for the former, as well as the other way around [58, 59, 21]. This involves the development of joint models which
encode assumptions about the probabilistic relationships between neural and cognitive parameters.
Within our framework, the reconstruction of information-theoretic discrete time series yields a quantitative account
of the agent’s internal processing of environmental information. Event-related cognitive measures of belief updating,
epistemic uncertainty and surprise can be put in relation with neural measurements by explicitly providing a formal
account of the statistical dependencies between neural and cognitive (information-theoretic) quantities. In this way,
latent cognitive dynamics can be directly related to neural event-related measures (e.g., fMRI, EEG). Applications
in which information-theoretic measures are treated as dependent variables in standard statistical analysis are also
possible.
Neurological Assessment. Although neuroscientists have considered performance in the WCST as a proxy for mea-
suring high-level cognitive processes, the usual approach to the analysis of human adaptive behavior consists in sum-
marizing response patterns by simple heuristic scoring measures (e.g. occurrences of correct responses and sub-types
of errors produced) and classification rules [20]. However, the theoretical utility of such a summary approach remains
questionable. Indeed, adaptive behavior appears to depend on a complex and intricate interplay between multiple
network structures [4, 40, 38, 5, 12]. This posits a great challenge for disentangling high-level cognitive constructs
at a model level and further investigating their relationship with neurobiological substrates. It appears that standard
scoring measures might not be able to fulfil these tasks. Moreover, there is a pronounced lack of anatomical specificity
in previous research concerning the neural and functional substrates of the WCST [43].
Thus, there is a need for more sophisticated modeling approaches. For instance, disentangling errors due to persever-
ative processing of previously relevant environmental models from those due to uncertainty about task environmental
states, is important and nontrivial. Sparse and distributed error patterns might depend on several internal model prob-
ability configurations. Such internal models are latent, and can only be uncovered through cognitive modeling. There-
fore, information-based criteria to response (error) classification can enrich clinical evaluation beyond heuristically
motivated criteria.
Generalizability. Another important advantage of the proposed computational framework is that it is not solely con-
fined to the WCST. In fact, one can argue that the seventy-year old WCST does not provide the only or even the most
suitable setting for extracting information about cognitive dynamics from general populations or maladaptive behavior
in clinical populations. One can envision tasks which embody probabilistic (uncertain) or even chaotic environments
(for instance with partially observable or unreliable feedback or partially observable states) and demand integrating
information from different modalities [45, 42]. These settings might prove more suitable for investigating changes in
uncertainty-related processing or cross-modal integration than deterministic and fully observable WCST-like settings.
Note that, as it currently stands, our framework is directly extendable to these richer settings.
Despite these advantages, our proposed computational framework has some limitations. A first limitation might con-
cern the fact that the new Bayesian cognitive model accounts for the main dynamics in adaptive tasks by relying on
only two parameters. Although such a parsimonious proposal suffices to disentangle latent data-generating processes,
a more exhaustive formal description of cognitive sub-components might be envisioned. However, model identifica-
tion can become challenging is such a scenario, especially when sparse one-dimensional response data is used as a
basis for parameter recovery.
Second, as it currently stands, model identification is optimal only when the entire sequence of 128 trials in the
WCST is used. However, in the Heaton version, the task can end with only after several sorting rule changes. Using
incomplete data appears suboptimal for parameter recovery and results in large uncertainty estimates and multimodal
posteriors. Future research should focus on designing and employing more data-rich RL tasks which can provide a
better starting point for recovering complex latent cognitive dynamics.
In conclusion, the proposed model can be considered as the basis for a (bio)psychometric tool for measuring the dy-
namics of cognitive processes under changing environmental demands. Furthermore, it can be seen as a step towards
a theory-based framework for investigating the relation between such cognitive measures and their neural underpin-
nings. Further investigations are needed to refine the proposed computational model and systematically explore the
advantages of the Bayesian brain theoretical framework for empirical research on high-level cognition.
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